

Executive Registry

79-231/1

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
PERMANENT SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 24, 1979

Honorable Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20505


Dear Admiral Turner:

Enclosed, for your information, is an advance copy of a staff report of the Subcommittee on Evaluation, which will be issued later today.

I appreciate the full cooperation that was granted to the Committee staff conducting this study. Such cooperation by all elements of the intelligence community enabled the staff to address the subject with the care and thoroughness it deserves.

Any comments you may wish to give the Committee on the report, or on the subjects it deals with, would of course be welcome.

Sincerely,



Charlie Rose, Chairman  
Subcommittee on Evaluation

Enc.:

Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence  
Performance Prior to November 1978

IRAN: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence

Performance Prior to November 1978

January 1979

Staff Report

Subcommittee on Evaluation

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

U.S. House of Representatives

IRAN: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance  
Prior to November 1978


### INTRODUCTION

In late 1977 and early 1978 violent demonstrations erupted in Iran against the 25-year rule of the Shah. Renewed violence during the summer and fall appeared to put the monarchy in jeopardy, and with it the substantial U.S. interest in Iran's stability. Administration review of U.S. policy options toward Iran in early November resulted in White House assurance to the Shah of support for his efforts to restore order.

Soon afterward President Carter expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of political intelligence, and press reports reflected the frustration of Administration officials who felt that the inadequacy of intelligence had narrowed American policy choices. In his November 30 press conference, President Carter restated his concern, emphasizing the need for good assessment of "intelligence derived through normal political channels." Debate over the "intelligence failure" in Iran has continued.

Following preliminary examination in early December, the Chairman of the Subcommittee concluded that weaknesses in the intelligence community's performance in this case were serious enough to warrant further attention. The staff then undertook a more thorough study of intelligence community performance during the period preceding the current crisis. The following report is based on interviews with analysts and managers at CIA, the Department of State, DIA, and NSA; and on an extensive review of intelligence field reporting, finished current intelligence reporting, analytical pieces, and public sources.

### FINDINGS



25X

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001500060003-3

Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001500060003-3